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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR 
HOMICIDE: A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
JAMES W. HARLOW† 
ABSTRACT 
  Since the nineteenth century, judges, legislators, prosecutors, and 
academics have grappled with how best to accommodate within the 
criminal law corporations whose conduct causes the death of others. 
The result of this debate was a gradual legal evolution towards 
acceptance of corporate criminal liability for homicide. But, as this 
Note argues, the underlying legal framework for such liability is ill 
fitting and largely ineffective. Given the public benefit that would 
accrue from a clearly defined and potent liability scheme, this Note 
proposes a model criminal statute that would hold corporations 
directly liable for homicide. The proposed statute draws upon basic 
precepts of corporate criminal liability, as well as legislative 
developments in the United Kingdom and the insights of 
organizational theory. Ultimately, this Note argues that a statutory 
scheme would allow prosecutions of corporations for homicide to 
proceed more accurately, effectively, and fairly. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, 2010, an explosion ripped through the Upper Big 
Branch coal mine in West Virginia, claiming the lives of twenty-nine 
miners.1 A report commissioned by West Virginia’s governor 
determined that the explosion was caused by the ignition of methane 
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 1. John M. Broder, Fatal Mine Blast Was Preventable, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2011, at A17. 
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and coal dust, which had built up in the mine due to insufficient 
ventilation and malfunctioning water-spray systems.2 From June 2006 
to April 2010, federal officials had cited Performance Coal Company, 
a subsidiary of Massey Energy and the owner of the Upper Big 
Branch mine, hundreds of times for serious safety violations.3 In 
fourteen of the fifteen months leading up the explosion, the Upper 
Big Branch mine received citations related to its handling of coal 
dust—a primary cause of the April 5th explosion.4 Despite these 
repeated safety violations, Upper Big Branch management did not 
implement an effective compliance program, instead adopting a 
“catch me if you can” mentality toward regulation.5 
In April 2010, an explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico claimed eleven lives.6 A presidential 
investigatory commission found that the explosion resulted from a 
failure to properly seal off the well and contain the enormous 
pressures that had built up inside.7 The commission also determined 
that the root causes of the explosion could “be traced back to 
underlying failures of management and communication” by BP—
formerly British Petroleum—who, along with its partners, owned and 
operated the rig.8 For example, BP engineers had continued to revise 
the procedure for sealing the well until hours before the explosion 
without a full risk assessment.9 Furthermore, prior to the explosion, 
rig workers had worried about safe practices taking a back seat to 
drilling operations and about their inability to communicate their 
concerns to senior managers ashore.10 Transocean, the company that 
operated the rig, left the crew in the dark about an “eerily similar 
 2. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 
2010, EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 16, 23 (2011). 
 3. Sam Hananel, Federal Prosecutors Are Conducting Criminal Probe in W.Va. Mine 
Explosion, WASH. POST, May 15, 2010, at A16. 
 4. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 54. 
 5. David A. Fahrenthold & Kimberly Kindy, Safety Chief Details Mine’s History of 
Violations, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at A2. 
 6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, at vi (2011). 
 7. Id. at 115. 
 8. Id. at 122. 
 9. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER 140 (2011). 
 10. Ian Urbina, Workers on Doomed Rig Voiced Concern on Safety, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2010, at A1. 
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near-miss” that took place on another rig a few months before the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion.11 
Between June and November of 2010, six residents at North 
Carolina’s Glen Care assisted-living center died after being infected 
with hepatitis B during blood-sugar checks by facility staff.12 Upon 
investigation, state health inspectors found that the staff were 
generally untrained in disease prevention and had reused improperly 
sterilized equipment to check the residents’ glucose levels—both of 
which constituted regulatory violations.13 Although the center’s 
management had known that precautionary training was required by 
state law and had offered training sessions for staff members,14 
management had failed to ensure that all of the staff members had 
received the necessary instruction.15 
Each of the above examples illustrates a common flaw in the 
relationship between a corporation16 and its employees or the 
consumers of its products. In each instance, a corporation failed to 
adhere to government regulations or to internal policies designed to 
prevent harm. Each lapse resulted in the death of at least one 
individual, suggesting the potential applicability of criminal homicide 
law. Yet none of these examples will likely result in the filing of 
homicide charges, let alone a successful prosecution for the crime.17 
 11. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 124. 
 12. Thomas Goldsmith, Diabetes Care Gap Feared, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Dec. 26, 
2010, at 1A. 
 13. Mandy Locke, Dirty Diabetes Test Kits Blamed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 
17, 2010, at 1A; see also Goldsmith, supra note 12 (“What we saw were people who were not 
trained in fighting infection . . . . It’s not even sloppiness; it’s really ignorance.” (quoting Julie 
Henry, spokeswoman for the N.C. Division of Public Health)). 
 14. Glen Care of Mt. Olive, Statement of Deficiencies 1, 3–4 (N.C. Div. of Health Serv. 
Regulation Nov. 5, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 15. See id. at 2–3 (noting the nonattendance of employees at a safety lecture); Locke, supra 
note 13 (describing how several employees admitted to checking blood-sugar levels even though 
they had not attended training sessions on the subject). 
 16. This Note uses the term “corporation” throughout for the sake of brevity. The term 
should be read to refer to all manner of business entities regardless of formal incorporation 
status, including partnerships, limited liability companies, and other such entities. 
 17. Federal prosecutors continue to investigate the Upper Big Branch mine explosion, 
Hananel, supra note 3, but a similar federal criminal investigation into a deadly explosion at a 
Utah mine strongly suggests that homicide charges are unlikely to be forthcoming, see Howard 
Berkes, Still No Criminal Charges in 2007 Utah Mine Disaster, TWO-WAY: NPR’S NEWS BLOG 
(June 16, 2011, 12:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/06/16/137213027/still-no-
criminal-charges-in-2007-utah-mine-disaster (“Four years after nine coal miners and mine 
rescuers died underground in the Crandall Canyon mine in Utah, federal prosecutors say 
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This Note proceeds according to several basic premises: First, a 
corporation may be directly responsible for the deaths of the 
employees, consumers, and members of the general public with whom 
it interacts. Second, in situations of systemic internal misconduct or 
corporate recidivism, civil regulatory penalties and private lawsuits 
are insufficient to vindicate society’s interest in punishing the entity 
responsible for these deaths. Third, there are instances when a 
corporate entity is a truly blameworthy actor, rather than—or in 
addition to—individual employees, and when a criminal sanction 
against the corporation would have the greatest effect.18 This may be 
particularly true for large corporations given their complex 
bureaucratic structures.19 Fourth, current homicide schemes are ill 
equipped to accommodate corporate defendants.20 Historically, there 
have been few significant corporate prosecutions for homicide. Those 
that have occurred have tended to be against small companies in 
which ownership and management were united in the same 
individuals, who were also charged individually.21 The paucity of 
successful prosecutions suggests that current law does not provide 
prosecutors with the power to bring corporate homicide charges or, 
that if the power exists, its lack of clarity discourages prosecutors 
from bringing cases. 
To reconcile these basic premises, this Note proposes a statutory 
scheme that would allow corporate homicide prosecutions to proceed 
more accurately, effectively, and fairly. This proposal would improve 
they’re still not ready to file criminal charges or to conclude that no charges are warranted.”). 
The North Carolina Glen Care facility could face a $20,000 civil penalty and increased 
monitoring by health officials. Locke, supra note 13. Interestingly, reports indicate that federal 
authorities are at least considering bringing manslaughter charges against the companies behind 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill under the federal Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1115 (2006). Jerry Markon, Criminal Charges Considered in Oil Spill, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 
2011, at A2. 
 18. To clarify, this Note does not contend that corporate liability should replace individual 
culpability. If culpable individuals are found, they should be prosecuted for manslaughter or 
homicide. Rather, the proposed statute seeks to patch a hole in the criminal-liability fabric. 
 19. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 834 
(1927) (“[I]t may on occasion, be clear enough that some individuals have committed a crime for 
corporate purposes, and yet not clear who those individuals are. It is moreover relatively 
difficult to apprehend and prosecute a number, particularly a large number, of individuals, even 
if their identity is known; the corporation is always readily available.”). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See, e.g., State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 916, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2010) (affirming a sewage-treatment company’s conviction for negligent homicide based on the 
acts of its president). 
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accuracy by acknowledging the true severity and blameworthiness of 
corporate conduct. It would increase efficacy by opening up avenues 
for criminal liability. And it would advance principles of fairness by 
providing notice to corporate actors and by advocating for sentences 
focused on rehabilitation. Prior scholarship on corporate homicide is 
limited because it was written immediately after formative doctrinal 
events, without the benefit of several decades of practical 
development.22 Moreover, prior statutory proposals either sought to 
expand criminal liability to encompass life-endangering acts of 
corporations23 or to limit it to workplace incidents.24 In contrast, this 
Note relies on experiences in the United States and abroad to craft a 
statute narrow enough to avoid overcriminalization but broad enough 
to reach serious corporate misconduct. 
Part I of this Note recounts the development of corporate 
criminal liability for homicide. Part II analyzes the policy rationales 
for and against the use of criminal law to hold corporations liable for 
homicide. Part III identifies failings within the current U.S. system of 
corporate homicide liability. Part IV reviews the corporate homicide 
statutory scheme enacted in the United Kingdom. And Part V 
proposes a corporate homicide statute, explains each section of the 
statute, and provides several illustrative applications. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
FOR HOMICIDE 
This Part briefly reviews precedents relating to corporate 
criminal liability for homicide. It traces the early, largely unsuccessful 
attempts to hold corporations criminally liable for homicide. Then, it 
 22. For examples of earlier scholarship on corporate homicide, see generally Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 753 (1987); Patrick Hamilton, Comment, Corporate Criminal 
Liability for Injuries and Death, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1091 (1992); Donald J. Miester, Jr., 
Comment, Criminal Liability for Corporations That Kill, 64 TUL. L. REV. 919 (1990); and John 
E. Stoner, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control 
Corporate Behavior?, 38 SW. L.J. 1275 (1985). 
 23. See, e.g., W. Allen Spurgeon & Terence P. Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-
Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 430–32 (1981) 
(advocating for the adoption of a criminal prohibition against life-endangering corporate 
conduct). 
 24. See, e.g., Anne D. Samuels, Note, Reckless Endangerment of an Employee: A Proposal 
in the Wake of Film Recovery Systems To Make the Boss Responsible for His Crimes, 20 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 873, 902–04 (1987) (drafting a criminal statute prohibiting the reckless 
endangerment of an employee). 
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surveys the modern developments in corporate homicide doctrine and 
summarizes the existing state of the law. 
A. Early Prosecution Efforts 
Early efforts to prosecute corporations for homicide were 
grounded in a pragmatic desire to balance increasing corporate power 
over social and economic life with the public’s need to hold corporate 
entities accountable for their actions.25 Reflecting this desire, a federal 
appellate court held in United States v. Van Schaick26 that “[a] 
corporation can be guilty of causing death by its wrongful act.”27 Van 
Schaick arose after a steamship disaster left hundreds dead and the 
corporate shipowner was indicted for manslaughter under a federal 
maritime statute that prohibited fraudulent and negligent safety 
practices.28 The court unhesitatingly dismissed the arguments against 
corporate liability,29 finding that Congress had not intended “to give 
the owner impunity simply because it happened to be a 
corporation.”30 The Van Schaick court declined to absolve “corporate 
carriers by sea [that] kill their passengers through misconduct that 
would be a punishable offense if done by a natural person.”31 
Several years later, in 1909, the Supreme Court echoed the 
pragmatic reasoning of Van Schaick in its seminal decision in New 
York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States,32 basing 
federal corporate criminal liability on the principle of respondeat 
superior.33 The Court justified its extension of corporate criminal 
 25. It is important to distinguish between holding the corporate entity liable for homicide 
and holding individual officers and employees personally liable. At the time of Blackstone, the 
former was unknown at common law; the latter was generally accepted. See 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or 
other crime, in it’s corporate capacity: though it’s members may, in their distinct individual 
capacities.” (footnote omitted)). This Note is concerned with the former. 
 26. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
 27. Id. at 602. 
 28. Id. at 595–96. The steamship’s captain and the company’s officers were also indicted for 
manslaughter. Id. at 594–95. 
 29. It was argued that the corporate defendant could not be indicted because the sole 
statutory penalty was imprisonment, which it could not serve. Id. at 602. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 33. Id. at 494–95. For a richer explication of modern respondeat superior doctrine, see 
Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial 
Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 64–65 (2007). Much ink has been 
spilled decrying and defending the New York Central decision. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The 
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liability by highlighting the centrality of corporations to the country’s 
economic life,34 the corporation’s ability to commit the charged 
offense,35 and the public-policy benefits afforded by criminal 
lity.36 
Although the federal courts in Van Schaick and New York 
Central were willing to construe federal statutes to cover corporate 
conduct, state courts were fractured in their application of general 
homicide statutes to corporate entities. In State v. Lehigh Valley 
Railroad37, the Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted a negligence-
based prosecution of a railroad for involuntary manslaughter.38 The 
court held that it would accept corporate criminal liability “unless 
there is something in the nature of the crime, the character of the 
punishment prescribed therefor, or the essential ingredients of the 
crime, which makes it impossible for a corporation to be held” 
liable.39 As the capacity for corporate criminal liability in negligence-
based crimes was “elementary,” the involuntary manslaughter charge 
easily fit within that scheme.40 The court cautioned, however, that 
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1329, 1338, 1358 (2009) (characterizing corporate criminal liability as violating “all three of 
the necessary conditions for criminal responsibility” and “inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles of a liberal society”); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal 
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 824 (1996) (“The respondeat superior theory was the only 
approach available in New York Central to preserve corporate criminal liability in the face of 
the due process challenge without completely foreclosing other constitutional protections to 
corporate defendants.”). Nevertheless, the holding of New York Central is a legal fixture 
unlikely to be overturned. And this is for the best. Although pure respondeat superior may not 
be the perfect means of attaching criminal liability to corporations, it is by no means unjust or 
illogical. 
 34. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495 (“[T]he great majority of business transactions in 
modern times are conducted through these bodies, and . . . interstate commerce is almost 
entirely in their hands . . . .”). 
 35. See id. (noting that by prohibiting certain railroad rebates, “[t]his statute does not 
embrace things impossible to be done by a corporation”). 
 36. See id. (warning that if corporate criminal liability were impossible, “many offenses 
might go unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law, where, as in the present case, 
the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices forbidden 
in the interest of public policy”). 
 37. State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 103 A. 685 (N.J. 1917). 
 38. Id. at 687. 
 39. Id. at 685–86. 
 40. Id. at 686. To support its claim that corporate liability for negligence was “elementary,” 
the court referred to nineteenth-century developments that held corporations liable for what 
Professor V.S. Khanna characterizes as “all offenses that did not require criminal intent.” V.S. 
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 
1481 (1996). 
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hom
ve been formulated which 
wou
promulgating an alternative standard to respondeat superior for 
corporate criminal liability,48 the MPC’s drafters surveyed past 
corporate prosecutions and found that they were “restricted for the 
“voluntary manslaughter involves ingredients quite different from 
those involved in involuntary manslaughter,”41 suggesting that it 
would not so rea
icide charge. 
As intimated by the Lehigh Valley court’s reservations about 
voluntary manslaughter, many state courts in the early- to mid-
twentieth century held that their respective general homicide statutes 
did not encompass corporate entities. Absent specific legislative 
instruction, several courts categorically dismissed corporate 
indictments for manslaughter.42 For example, New York’s homicide 
statute, as then drafted, proscribed “the killing of one human being 
by the act, procurement or omission of another.”43 In rejecting an 
attempt to charge a corporation with manslaughter, a New York 
court held that, absent legislative intent “to abandon the limitation of 
its enactments to human beings or to include a corporation as a 
criminal,”44 a homicide statute should be construed to mean a killing 
“by another human being.”45 The New York court acknowledged, 
however, that this was primarily a matter of legislative draftsmanship 
because a homicide statute “might ha
ld be applicable to a corporation.”46 
As drafted, homicide statutes implicitly reflected the belief of 
policymakers that there were some crimes for which corporations 
simply could not—or should not—be liable. Even the Supreme Court, 
as it was broadly expanding corporate criminal liability in New York 
Central, acknowledged that “there are some crimes, which in their 
nature cannot be committed by corporations.”47 This reluctance to 
permit corporate prosecutions for homicide persisted at the time of 
the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) drafting in the 1950s. In the course of 
 
 41. Lehigh Valley, 103 A. at 686. 
 42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 153 S.W. 459, 461 (Ky. 1913) (“[H]omicide, 
in any of its degrees, is not an offense for which a corporation may be indicted . . . .”); People v. 
ence of 
 the part of the Legislature to abandon the limitation of its enactments to human 
ude a corporation as a criminal.”). 
hester Ry. & Light, 88 N.E. at 24 (quoting N.Y. PENAL CODE § 179 (1908)). 
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22, 24 (N.Y. 1909) (“[W]e do not discover any evid
an intent on
beings or to incl
 43. Roc
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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bodi
g the 
defin
most part to thefts—including frauds—and involuntary 
manslaughter.”49 There had been no case in which “a corporation was 
sought to be held criminally liable for . . . murder.”50 The lack of any 
development of corporate liability for homicide thus continued to 
reflect the prevailing sentiment at the time that “homicide by its very 
nature lies in the field of inherently human relations.”51 
B. Modern Developments in Prosecuting Corporations 
In the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers reconceptualized corporate
criminal liability for homicide. Alongside the creation of regulatory 
es charged with ensuring employee and consumer safety,52 the 
judiciary interpreted statutory amendments as removing ideological 
and doctrinal barriers to corporate homicide prosecutions. In 
practice, however, these developments did not remove all of the 
obstacles in the path of an optimal corporate homicide scheme. 
With a subtle yet significant stroke of the pen, legislatures 
broadened corporate criminal liability for homicide by amendin
itional provisions in state penal codes. Early attempts to charge 
corporations with homicide had floundered because the homicide 
statutes required that the victim be a “person” and that the conduct 
be committed “by another.”53 To remedy this limitation, legislatures 
amended their penal codes to include corporations within the basic 
definition of a “person” and to delete the requirement that certain 
 
 47. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909); see also 
Edgerton, supra note 19, at 841 (arguing in 1927 that there was no legal bar that “preclude[d] 
the commission of some crimes, like murder, . . . by corporations”). 
 48. The MPC predicates corporate liability upon the conduct of corporate employees of 
sufficient standing within the corporation’s power structure. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.07(1)(c) 1962) (attaching liability to conduct that has been “authorized, requested, 
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or 
employment”). 
 49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmts. at 150 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). 
 50. Id. 
 51. State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en banc) (holding that a 
corporation cannot be indicted for homicide); see also Brickey, supra note 22, at 753 (describing 
early corporate prosecutions for homicide as “anomalous”). 
 52. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2006)) (creating the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC)); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006)) (creating the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA)). 
 53. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
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crimes be committed by a human being.54 A caveat commonly 
accompanied these definitional amendments, however, stipulating 
that corporate criminal liability should attach only “where 
appropriate.”55 
Several courts seized upon these legislative amendments, seeing 
them as a manifestation of the legislature’s “clear intention”56 to 
expand corporate criminal liability to homicide.57 In so doing, these 
courts accepted without discussion that homicide constituted a 
legislatively “appropriate” extension of criminal liability to 
corporations.58 In at least one state, the judicial expansion of 
homicide liability to corporations was deemed valid not because of 
prior legislative action, but because of subsequent legisla
tion.59 
In the wake of these legislative and judicial developments, 
prosecutors around the country began filing homicide charges against 
corporate actors.60 This expanded use of corporate homicide charges 
was also the product of highly publicized examples of extreme 
 54. Brickey, supra note 22, at 758. 
 55. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.080(12) (West 2006) (“‘Person’ means a human 
being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a 
partnership, a government, or a governmental authority . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 56. Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). 
 57. See, e.g., People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding 
that after the inclusion of a corporation within the Penal Code’s definition of personhood, “a 
corporation cannot be the victim of a homicide, [but] it may commit that offense and be held to 
answer therefor”); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139, 1142–43 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that a corporation is a person within the statutory definition of 
involuntary manslaughter); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1987) (en banc) (“The Legislature, recognizing that for years Texas was the only 
jurisdiction in which corporations bore no general criminal responsibility, and aware of the 
previous roadblocks in case law to the prosecution of corporations for criminal offenses, enacted 
statutes to remedy the situation.”). 
 58. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(describing the Ebasco Services and Fortner LP Gas courts’ expansion of liability to homicide as 
resting upon “a much weaker [statutory] definition” due to the presence of “when appropriate” 
language). The Arizona courts addressed the issue and adopted a default position of placing the 
impetus on the legislature to specifically exclude, rather than include, corporate liability for 
offenses. See State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 922–23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). 
 59. See State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (finding 
that “the legislature [had been] aware that court decisions [had] held corporations criminally 
liable” when it twice revised Wisconsin’s homicide statutes and noting that, “and on both 
occasions, the legislature [had] elected not to undo corporate criminal liability”). 
 60. See, e.g., Michael B. Bixby, Workplace Homicide: Trends, Issues, and Policy, 70 OR. L. 
REV. 333, 335–56 (1991) (surveying several prosecutions that occurred between 1985 and 1991 
in which employee deaths led to homicide charges against the corporate employer). 
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corporate misconduct that had resulted in death. For example, Ford 
Motor Company was prosecuted for reckless homicide after three 
young women died because their Ford Pinto burst into flames 
following a rear-end collision.61 Similarly, the manslaughter 
prosecution of Film Recovery Systems after the death of an 
undocumented Polish factory worker made national news.62 Finally, 
the front page of the New York Times reported the manslaughter trial 
of the Six Flags Corporation after eight New Jersey teenagers died in 
an amusement park fire.63 One commentator describes these cases 
and the others brought against corporations as a “prosecutorial 
wave.”64 To date, at least fifteen states plus the federal government 
have prosecuted co
 61. See State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2514, 2515 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1979) (sustaining 
an indictment against Ford for reckless homicide because Ford “had sufficient notice of the 
s and inaction from corporate officials who knew of the danger posed by 
REV. 378, 393–94 (1988) 
cide 
application of . . . reckless homicide to it”). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, 3 Executives Convicted of Murder for Unsafe Workplace 
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1985, at 1 (discussing the manslaughter conviction of the 
corporation and the murder convictions of individual officers); see also Brickey, supra note 22, 
at 770–75 (describing the prosecution of Film Recovery Systems on the basis of dangerous 
factory condition
cyanide vapors). 
 63. Donald Janson, Great Adventure Owners Cleared of Criminal Charges in Fatal Fire, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1985, at 1; see also David J. Reilly, Comment, Murder, Inc.: The Criminal 
Liability of Corporations for Homicide, 18 SETON HALL L. 
(summarizing the procedural history of the Six Flags prosecution). 
 64. Carol L. Bros, A Fresh Assault on the Hazardous Workplace: Corporate Homi
Liability for Workplace Fatalities in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 308 (1989). 
 65. See United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602–05 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (permitting 
the indictments of a corporation and its individual officers for manslaughter under a federal 
maritime statute); State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) 
(affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent homicide); Granite Constr. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 4 (Ct. App. 1983) (permitting the indictment of a 
corporation for manslaughter under California law); People v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090, 1098 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing the involuntary manslaughter conviction of an Illinois corporation 
and its individual officers based on mutually exclusive mental states); Ford Motor Co., 47 
U.S.L.W. at 2515 (sustaining an indictment against Ford for reckless homicide under Indiana 
law); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) 
(upholding the indictment of a corporation for second-degree manslaughter under Kentucky 
law); Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 842 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Mass. 2006) (affirming the 
conviction of a corporation for motor-vehicle homicide under Massachusetts law); People v. 
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 438 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (sustaining the 
indictment of a corporation for involuntary manslaughter under Michigan law); State v. Lehigh 
Valley R.R. Co., 103 A. 685, 687 (N.J. 1917) (upholding the indictment of a corporation for 
involuntary manslaughter under New Jersey law); People v. Ebasco Servs. Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 
807, 811–12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (permitting, as a matter of New York law, the indictment of a 
corporation for criminally negligent homicide but dismissing the indictment in the case on other 
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Nonetheless, the current state of corporate homicide doctrine 
suggests that the wave has lost its momentum. In jurisdictions where 
corporate liability for homicide is accepted as a basic theoretical 
premise, its reach has been constrained by judicial construction.66 The 
reported cases of corporate homicide suggest that prosecutions are 
skewed toward small businesses.67 Punishments for corporations—
even large ones—convicted of homicide at the state level tend to be 
disproportionately smaller than the harm the corporation caused.68 
Lastly, the diminished and suboptimal state of corporate homicide 
doctrine is reflected in the willingness of prosecutors to undercharge a 
corporate entity even when its conduct is particularly egregious and 
results in a loss of life.69 
grounds); State v. Consol. Rail Corp., C.A. No. L-81-033, 1981 WL 5726, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 24, 1981) (requiring the trial court to address the validity of a corporate indictment for 
vehicular homicide under Ohio law); Commonwealth v. McIlwain Sch. Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 
413, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (sustaining the indictment of a corporation for criminal homicide 
by vehicle under Pennsylvania law); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent 
homicide under Texas law); State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1995) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent homicide under 
Wisconsin law); Patrick J. Schott, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Work-Site Deaths: 
Old Law Used a New Way, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 805 (1988) (describing the Connecticut 
prosecution of PGP Industries Inc. for criminally negligent homicide that was ultimately 
dismissed during the trial); Randall Chase, Refinery Fined in Deadly Blast, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
July 9, 2003, at B03 (reporting that a corporation pled no contest to charges of criminally 
negligent homicide under Delaware law). 
 66. See, e.g., O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1101 (reversing the convictions of the corporate and 
individual defendants charged in the Film Recovery Systems case because the convictions were 
“legally inconsistent,” given that the “same conduct [was] used to support offenses which ha[d] 
mutually exclusive mental states”); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 665–66 
(N.Y. 1980) (dismissing the indictment against a corporate defendant for a factory explosion 
that killed six employees because there was insufficient proof that the corporation could have 
foreseen the explosion). 
 67. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 n.1 (1999) (“On average, small privately held 
businesses account for more than 95% of all corporate convictions each year.”). 
 68. See infra note 227. 
 69. For example, in 2006, Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Company and several individual 
managers were convicted of criminal conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and other offenses 
related to the death of an employee who was driving an unsafe forklift. The evidence showed 
that for months prior to the accident, managers and supervisors knew that employees were 
being required to drive forklifts with inoperable brakes and other defects. United States v. Atl. 
States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d 180, 328–29 (D.N.J. 2009). Strikingly, neither the 
company nor the individual managers were charged for homicide. 
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II.  IS PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR HOMICIDE SOUND 
POLICY? 
Although this Note ultimately endorses a redesigned regime of 
corporate criminal liability for homicide,70 it is worth pausing to 
discuss this proposal’s policy implications. The use of public policy in 
the development of corporate criminal liability extends back one 
century to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Central.71 This 
Part considers whether the extension of corporate criminal liability to 
homicide best serves society’s needs. It first makes the normative case 
for criminal liability. Then it considers and rebuts several 
counterarguments, including the sufficiency of civil remedies—e.g., 
private litigation or civil regulatory schemes—and the potential for 
overdeterrence and overburdening businesses. 
A. Policy Goals Served by Prosecutions 
1. Corporate Entities May Be To Blame for the Loss of Life.  
Modern corporations exercise great influence over social, political,72 
and economic life. Corporations also enjoy significant constitutional 
and legal rights.73 The possession and proper exercise of this kind of 
power are cornerstones of capitalism. Regrettably though, there are 
instances in which corporate misconduct has caused significant harm 
to communities.74 And even more regrettably, some of these 
 70. See infra Part V. 
 71. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 72. For example, from 1998 to 2010, twelve of the top twenty entities with the greatest 
political lobbying expenditures were individual corporations; the twentieth-ranked company 
spent over $100 million during that thirteen-year period. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying: 
Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&
indexType=s (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). Another seven of the top spenders were industry 
interest groups. Id. 
 73. See generally 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 1.04 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the constitutional rights of corporations); 
Henning, supra note 33 (describing the constitutional rights of corporations recognized by the 
Supreme Court as being in the criminal realm). In 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporate 
political speech unaffiliated with a specific political campaign enjoyed First Amendment 
protection, thereby broadening the list of corporate rights beyond what courts had previously 
recognized. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). One commentator opines that 
after Citizens United, it has become easier to argue for corporate criminal liability because “an 
entity that has political will also has free will.” Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & 
Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 77, 79 (2010). 
 74. Recent large-scale corporate malfeasances have included massive accounting frauds 
and longstanding corporate initiatives to bribe public officials around the globe. See Sara Sun 
Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 
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lished by 
indiv
force that can cause a corporation to hazard great risks.83 In such 
occasions have led to the deaths of employees,75 consumers,76 and 
members of the general public.77 This recitation is not intended to 
suggest that corporations are bad. Rather, it is intended to illustrate 
that in those rare cases when a corporation exercises its power and 
violates the law, that corporation has “the ability to engage in 
misconduct that dwarfs that which could be accomp
iduals.”78 
Criminal law should—and does—apply to blameworthy 
corporate conduct that merits condemnation and punishment.79 
Arguments that corporations are mere legal fictions without distinct 
identities, cultures, and moralities ignore the reality of the situation.80 
Organizational theorists recognize that an organization’s culture is 
closely intertwined with its leadership.81 Management may create a 
culture that sacrifices safety for profits, or it may create a safety-first 
culture.82 The desire for profits can be a powerful—even irresistible—
 
1484 (2009) (noting that Siemens AG pled guilty for paying “more than $1.4 billion in bribes to 
government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, using its 
slush funds”); Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell 
Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 91–95 
0 al frauds). 
 and accompanying text. 
“resulted in an estimated 2000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of 
ose conduct often causes very significant harm 
e often behave differently—
e is ultimately created, embedded, evolved, and ultimately manipulated by 
a ”
ing values 
a  
(2 04) (recounting examples of recent corporate financi
 75. See supra notes 1–7
 76. See infra note 156. 
 77. See Daniel Barstow Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring a Solution, 57 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 835, 835 (1986) (noting that the release of poisonous gas from a Union Carbide India 
Ltd. plant in Bhopal, India, 
other personal injuries”). 
 78. Beale, supra note 74, at 1484. 
 79. See id. at 1482 (defending corporate criminal liability because corporations “are 
enormously powerful, and very real, actors wh
both to individuals and to society as a whole”). 
 80. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473, 493 (2006) (“The truth is that institutions do produce wrongdoing.”); see also id. at 493–95 
(surveying psychological studies that describe how “peopl
sometimes better, sometimes worse—in institutional settings”). 
 81. See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 3 (4th ed. 
2010) (“[C]ultur
le ders. ). 
 82. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1503, 1532 (2007) (“Companies can develop distinctive cultures (or an ethos) includ
th t are contrary to general norms, which they encourage their employees to flout.”). 
 83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmts. at 148–49 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) 
(acknowledging that “there are probably cases in which the economic pressures within the 
corporate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal liability for the 
sake of company gain”); 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 8.21, at 384 (noting that when 
corporate employees “feel compelled to risk penal sanctions to earn status, approval, or security 
HARLOW IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:52:03 PM 
2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE 137 
”85 
cases, the corporation may be the truly blameworthy actor, rather 
than any one employee.84 Thus, there are instances in which 
individual “human behavior, including behavior legally defined as 
criminal, . . . is explicable (even describable) only with reference to 
the institutional settings where it arises.
When a loss of life has occurred and a corporation itself is the 
blameworthy entity, criminal law provides society with a uniquely 
powerful tool to both express its condemnation of the corporation’s 
actions and reform the corporation to ensure that its conduct will 
conform with societal expectations going forward.86 Reflecting on the 
Ford Pinto prosecution, for example, one commentator argues that 
the prosecution’s principal significance was not its “attempt to 
establish precedent for a new weapon to be deployed regularly 
against corporate crime.”87 Instead, it was the prosecution’s “attempt 
to make a corporation answer to a jury when business practices are 
perceived as transgressions of a community’s moral boundaries.”88 
The expression of a community’s moral condemnation, even when 
applied to corporations, is unique to criminal law and goes beyond 
the utilitarian goals of rehabilitation and deterrence.89 There is 
significant intrinsic value to this expressive force when it is applied to 
corporations in the same way that it is applied to individuals.90 
 
in the corporate organization,” the “imposition of criminal liability on the corporation may be 
necessary if undesired conduct is to be controlled” (emphasis added)); Spurgeon & Fagan, supra 
,
hat rather than seeking individual scapegoats for an 
ess inherent in that prospect suggests compelling grounds 
r
ee id. at 477–78 (arguing that “[b]ecause of its communicative force and preference-
a
iam J. Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.: Constitutional, Utilitarian and Moral 
al liability instantiates a social practice 
EV. 1417, 1427 (2009) (“As an expression of the community’s moral judgment, 
note 23  at 413 n.66 (citing evidence that corporate managers perceived their colleagues as 
unable to forsake increased profits and keep potentially dangerous products off the shelves). 
 84. See Beale, supra note 82, at 1532 (“[T]here are many reasons to think that corporations 
and other entities are more than simply the sum of all of their employees and that punishing 
individual employees individually for criminal conduct will not always be sufficient.”); see also 
Brickey, supra note 22, at 784 (contending t
organizational failure, “[t]he unfairn
fo  declining to pierce the corporate veil”). 
 85. Buell, supra note 80, at 476. 
 86. S
sh ping authority, only criminal process fully produces these effects of legally imposed entity 
blame”). 
 87. Will
Perspectives, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 862 (1983). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Buell, supra note 80, at 537 (“[E]ntity crimin
of blaming institutions for crime that is characteristic of criminal law in its morally infused 
message, and in the stigmatic impact of that message.”). 
 90. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. R
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Homicide is not an “artificial” crime.91 A corporation’s criminal 
homicide sanction signifies that its conduct was grossly inimical to 
society’s interests. 
Finally, criminal law provides society with an important tool to 
effectuate change within a corporate organization in a way that 
fosters future conformity with societal expectations.92 A criminally 
liable corporation is one in which individual employees take 
erroneous actions and the necessary structures are not in place to 
counter those erroneous choices. Put plainly, deficiencies exist at the 
micro and macro levels within the organization.93 In response to a 
sharp rebuke of its practices, the corporation is likely “to 
reevaluat[e] . . . group arrangements, not just [to rethink] individual 
choice[s].”94 Beyond this self-motivated change, criminal law may also 
provide an avenue for court-supervised reevaluation and 
restructuring as part of a criminal sentence.95 
2. Supplementing Regulatory Efforts.  Corporate homicide 
liability may also supplement existing regulatory regimes by forcing 
recidivist violators to comply with health and safety regulations and 
acting as a backstop against lax regulatory oversight. Corporations 
determined to undercut or work around regulations are motivated by 
a simple cost-benefit analysis. Health and safety regulatory systems 
are successful only “where the expected costs of 
honoring . . . regulations are less than or equal to the expected costs 
of punishment.”96 The expected cost of punishment depends on “the 
there is a significant value to applying the criminal law to organizations that act through their 
agents . . . .”). 
 91. Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: 
The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1280 
(2007). Thornburgh characterizes many of the crimes springing from the regulatory state as 
“artificial” in the sense that “they do not meet the criteria traditionally employed in determining 
that particular conduct deserves society’s most severe condemnation.” Id. Homicide liability 
thus eludes many criticisms of increased corporate exposure to criminal sanctions. 
 92. See Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment Matter?, 19 J.L. 
& POL’Y 83, 93 (2010) (“Demanding concrete changes in how an organization conducts itself is 
a reasonable means of responding to the psychological perception that corporations can be 
blameworthy.”). 
 93. See Buell, supra note 80, at 502 (“A message of institutional fault says something 
different than a message of individual fault: not just that somebody pursued faulty preferences, 
but that the group arranged itself badly.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. For a more detailed discussion of this potential, see infra Part V.B.6. 
 96. Samuels, supra note 24, at 883. 
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egregious cases and tip the scales toward 
pree
lators “from 
inter
 
probability of inspection, the expected number of violations detected, 
and the average penalty per violation.”97 The lower the cost of 
punishment, the easier it is to accept serial regulatory violations to 
protect the bottom line. Existing enforcement capabilities may skew 
this analysis in favor of noncompliance.98 A homicide prosecution, 
with its harsher moral and punitive sanctions, might change the 
equation in particularly 
mptive compliance. 
For example, Massey Energy, the owner of the coal mine in 
which twenty-nine miners died in an explosion, was known for 
playing a cat-and-mouse game with federal mine-safety regulators.99 
Although Massey operated some of the most unsafe mines in the 
nation,100 it was able to avoid regulation by “persuad[ing] regulators 
to forgo safety rules on a case-by-case basis” and by “contest[ing] 
federal citations in a manner that ma[de] it virtually impossible for 
the government to force quick safety overhauls.”101 Recently, federal 
authorities sought to employ their most powerful civil remedy by 
going to court to close a Massey-owned mine and force a safety 
overhaul of Massey’s operations.102 But Massey “sidestepped” federal 
authorities and closed the mine on its own, keeping regu
fering with the company’s day-to-day operations.”103 
 97. Id. 
 98. From 2006 to 2010, OSHA statistics reflected a significant increase in the number of 
both willful and repeat violations. 2010 Enforcement Summary, OSHA, http://www.osha.gov/
dep/2010_enforcement_summary.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). Yet over that same period, the 
number of cases referred for criminal prosecution never exceeded fifteen per year. Id. And even 
then, the maximum criminal penalty for the first willful violation that resulted in death was a 
$10,000 fine and six months in prison 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006). For a second conviction, the 
penalty doubled. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. In January 2011, Massey Energy agreed to 
sell itself to a rival coal company. Interestingly, the purchasing company has a strong record of 
environmental and safety compliance. Michael J. de la Merced, Massey Energy Is To Be Sold to 
Alpha Natural Resources, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 29, 2011, 7:09 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2011/01/29/massey-energy-is-to-be-sold-to-alpha-natural-resources. 
 100. See Kimberly Kindy, Longtime Tug of War on Mine Safety, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2011, 
at A1 (reporting that Massey Energy owns the most mines of any company on the federal mine-
safety agency’s list of those in danger of being shut down). 
 101. Id.; see also GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 77 
(describing Massey as “relish[ing] the opportunity to challenge inspectors’ enforcement actions 
by disputing findings and arguing about what the law requires”). 
 102. See generally Complaint, Solis v. Freedom Energy Mining Co., No. 7:10-cv-00132-ART 
(E.D. Ky. Nov. 3, 2010) (filing by the Secretary of Labor to close the mine). 
 103. Kindy, supra note 100. 
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rector, spent $300 million to improve its health and 
envi
mplifies, criminal prosecutions may be successful as a 
mea
commission investigating the Deepwater Horizon oil-rig fire 
 
Consider also the case of McWane Industries. Between 1995 and 
2003, the manufacturing company had an egregious record: nine 
employees killed on the job, and citations for federal health and 
safety violations that exceeded those of its “six major competitors 
combined.”104 In eight of the nine fatalities, the circumstances 
reflected either “deliberate violations of federal safety standards” or 
“[s]afety lapses” that contributed to the deaths.105 Nonetheless, 
government regulators were initially unable to coordinate an effective 
response. Finally, after an exposé on McWane made national news, 
the company was convicted of criminal charges based on operations 
at six subsidiaries.106 More importantly, the company hired a new 
safety di
ronmental safety, and embarked on creating a new culture of 
safety.107 
Criminal law is admittedly a blunt instrument, but it may be 
necessary to force a company to take corrective actions. Massey 
Energy and McWane Industries are examples of companies that were 
determined to avoid compliance with regulatory standards over 
sustained periods of time. Shuttering a mine or taking post hoc 
remedial action cannot abrogate a criminal indictment. As the case of 
McWane exe
sure of last resort to bring about cultural change within a 
corporation. 
Criminal law can also serve a gap-filling function to ensure that 
the public is not without recourse when government regulation is lax. 
Budgets of regulatory agencies ebb and flow depending upon an 
administration’s goals. During lean years, inspections are curtailed, 
and violations go unnoticed or unpunished.108 The presidential 
 104. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A1. 
 105. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2003, at A1. 
 106. James Sandler, The McWane Prosecutions, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/prosecutions.html. 
 107. See Dave Johnson, 10 Essentials of McWane’s Culture Change, ISHN (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.ishn.com/Articles/Cover_Story/BNP_GUID_9-5-2006_A_10000000000000836462 
(interviewing the new safety director at McWane and reporting on the hiring of more health and 
safety staffers to increase incident reporting and accountability). 
 108. See Kindy, supra note 100 (noting that under the George W. Bush administration, the 
ranks of federal mine-safety inspectors were reduced by nine percent while the remaining 
inspectors were rebranded as “compliance assistance specialists”). 
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om political pressures, can serve as effective watchdogs of 
last resort. 
B. Rebuttal of Arguments for Limiting Corporate Homicide Liability 
Corporate defendants are also motivated to avoid the adverse 
 
recounted how the absence of effective regulatory oversight had 
contributed to deficient practices by private industry.109 Similarly, a 
state commission investigating the Upper Big Branch explosion found 
that mine-safety officials had performed their supervisory function 
inadequately.110 Given the powerful interests opposing strong 
regulatory regimes,111 state and federal prosecutors, who are more 
insulated fr
1. Civil-Law Remedies Are Preferred.  Critics of corporate 
criminal liability argue that civil law achieves deterrence and victim 
restitution at a lower cost to society.112 But the deterrent effect of civil 
suits upon a serial regulatory violator is doubtful, particularly when 
private lawsuits are settled for damages without imposing conditions 
of structural reform.113 Private litigants, who do not enjoy access to 
corporate treasuries to fund litigation, are incentivized to settle their 
disputes out of court before incurring expensive trial costs.114 
 109. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126 (“[N]either the regulations nor the regulators were asking the 
tough questions or requiring the demonstration of preparedness that could have avoided 
the . . . disaster.”). 
 110. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 77–78 (describing 
the deficiencies in government regulatory efforts). 
 111. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126 (recounting how “efforts to expand regulatory oversight, tighten 
safety requirements, and provide funding to equip regulators with the resources, personnel, and 
training needed to be effective were either overtly resisted or not supported by industry, 
members of Congress, and several administrations”). 
 112. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 40, at 1532 (“Due to expensive procedural protections and 
sanctioning costs from higher reputational penalties, sending the message [that society 
condemns a corporate action] through corporate criminal proceedings costs society more than 
sending the message through civil liability . . . .”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among 
Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1459, 1479 (2009) (advocating for the diminution of corporate criminal prosecutions and 
“for reforming, restoring, and enhancing private civil suits and agency regulation”). 
 113. See Samuels, supra note 24, at 880 (“Despite burgeoning civil judgments against 
corporate defendants, corporate decisionmakers assessing the need for precautionary measures 
too often find that the cost-efficient solution is also the most dangerous for their employees.”). 
 114. Id. at 886. 
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publicity of a public trial.115 Criminal law, on the other hand, deals in 
the unquantifiable—behavioral and moral reformation.116 
A more forceful critique of corporate criminal liability is that 
convicted corporations may face collateral debarment or delicensing 
proceedings that jeopardize the corporate existence, even if the 
criminal sanctions themselves are minimal.117 For example, companies 
convicted of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977118 are 
barred from receiving government contracts in the United States and 
the European Union.119 Corporate operators of a nursing home face 
the loss of Medicare and Medicaid licensing upon a criminal 
conviction.120 Because rehabilitation, not destruction, should be the 
goal of a corporate homicide scheme, these are serious concerns. But 
there are two rebuttals to this argument. First, civil proceedings or 
government regulatory action may also produce debarment and 
delicensing proceedings, so arguments that these consequences are 
unique harms of criminal law are unavailing.121 Second, evidence 
shows that prosecutors understand these collateral consequences and 
 115. Id. at 886–87. 
 116. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Civil 
liability of corporations, even when it allows the award of punitive as well as compensatory 
damages, is not a perfect substitute for [criminal punishment] because not all business activity 
that society wants to deter inflicts monetizable harms.”); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An 
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 36 
(“[C]rime is distinguished from other externalities because society has determined that in these 
instances, the social benefits of preference shaping through the criminal justice system outweigh 
the social costs because society values the utility derived from only one side of the incompatible 
preferences.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2039 (1992) (suggesting that the 
existence of debarment and delicensing mechanisms obviates the need for criminal sanctions 
like corporate probation). 
 118. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 119. See FAR 9.406 (2010) (allowing discretionary debarment when it would be in the public 
interest); Council Directive 2004/18, art. 45, 2004 O.J (L 134) 144 (EC) (barring any “candidate 
or tenderer” convicted of certain corrupt practices from participation in public contracts). 
 120. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(3) (2010) (granting the authority to revoke Medicare 
privileges when any “provider, supplier, or . . . owner of the provider or supplier” is convicted of 
certain felonies); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. § 153.018(F) (1994) (providing for the denial of, 
revocation of, or refusal to renew the licenses of long-term-care facilities for certain criminal 
acts). 
 121. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. §§ 500.1–.2 (2011) (authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Food Safety and Inspection Service to take certain “regulatory control action[s],” including the 
stoppage of production, in the case of violations); Beale, supra note 74, at 1502 (noting that 
certain civil judgments, such as those for fraud, also result in the debarment of government 
contractors). 
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that authorities have been willing to craft compromise solutions 
without sacrificing the societal and rehabilitative ends served by a 
criminal conviction.122 
Critics also point to the comparable basket of punitive and 
remedial measures available through a civil judgment.123 But this 
argument can be turned on its head: If civil and criminal ends are 
equal, why is the criminal proceeding so unpalatable? Indeed, in a 
criminal prosecution, a corporate defendant enjoys certain 
protections, such as a higher burden of proof, that are unavailable in a 
civil proceeding.124 Although a stigma accompanies a criminal trial 
and conviction, it is no different than the one faced by individual 
defendants who do not have immunity from prosecution. The 
criminal law’s overarching value is its singular ability to “convey[] the 
particular moral condemnation that expressive retribution 
contemplates.”125 When a corporation faces only civil liability for 
conduct that would give rise to criminal charges for an individual, it 
allows “the corporation qua corporation to purchase exemption from 
moral condemnation.”126 
2. Overdeterrence and Increased Costs of Doing Business.  Critics 
allege that an unwieldy use of criminal law will cause costly or 
inefficient overdeterrence that unnecessarily burdens businesses. 
These critics point to the danger that under a broad criminal statute, 
prosecutors might second-guess the “reasoned business judgments” of 
 122. See Sue Reisinger, Don’t Call It Bribery, CORP. COUNS., May 2010, at 15, 17 
(characterizing the Justice Department’s willingness to “pull[] its punches” and let BAE 
Systems plead to a conspiracy charge not subject to immediate debarment rather than to a 
substantive FCPA violation that would be subject to debarment as a “compromise settlement”); 
Sandler, supra note 106 (describing how the EPA, after receiving evidence from McWane 
Industries about its improved regulatory compliance, revised its initial recommendation of 
debarment and instead imposed a fixed-term probationary exclusion from receiving government 
contracts). 
 123. See, e.g., Howard E. O’Leary, Jr., Corporate Criminal Liability: Sensible Jurisprudence 
or Kafkaesque Absurdity?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2008, at 24, 28 (describing how a civilly liable 
corporation could be required to pay victim restitution and penalties and acquiesce to injunctive 
relief, and, “with the exception of a criminal fine, the corporation would be subject to all of the 
relief obtainable in a criminal prosecution”). 
 124. See Khanna, supra note 40, at 1512–20 (discussing how several criminal procedural 
safeguards apply to corporate defendants). 
 125. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 833, 854 (2000). 
 126. Id. at 858. 
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“legitimate commercial activity.”127 Moreover, the prospect of 
criminal liability might have desultory effects on industries that are ill 
equipped to withstand such scrutiny128 or that lack the funds to 
survive it.129 But these concerns do not support an absolute 
prohibition on criminal sanctions so much as they emphasize the need 
for its measured and balanced application. Whether civil or criminal 
proceedings are used, the ultimate goal should remain the same: to 
deter and prevent conduct that will lead to deaths. Industry itself 
recognizes the importance of this goal, and many corporations 
already have policies that place enhanced safety before saving time 
and money.130 In exercising their discretion, prosecutors should assess 
both the egregiousness of the corporation’s misconduct and the 
likelihood that the regulatory system will be able to reform the 
misconduct. Not every case should result in homicide charges. But 
industry should be on notice that mere financial hardship cannot 
excuse criminal behavior when a corporation’s conduct is particularly 
blameworthy.131 
III.  DEFICIENCIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
FOR HOMICIDE 
Despite the expansion of corporate liability for homicide in the 
United States since the 1970s, there remains room for improvement. 
The scheme is marked by a startling lack of clarity and efficacy.132 
 127. Brickey, supra note 22, at 783. 
 128. See, e.g., Richard M. Dunn, Sherril M. Colombo & Allison E. Nold, Criminalization in 
Aviation: Are Prosecutorial Investigations Relegating Aviation Safety to the Back Seat?, BRIEF, 
Spring 2009, at 10, 20 (“[C]riminal investigations impede aviation safety by chilling the free flow 
of information concerning the causes of accidents, but they fail to deter the negligent acts they 
are prosecuting because most aviation accidents are not caused by willful or intentional 
conduct.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12 (reporting an assisted-living facility industry 
lobbyist’s position that increased training of care providers is impossible because government 
programs “don’t include enough money to pay for higher levels of training”). 
 130. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126, 232–33 (detailing the “top-down safety culture” at major oil 
firms ExxonMobil and Shell that “reward[s] employees and contractors who take action when 
there is a safety concern even though such action costs the company time and money”). 
 131. See Buell, supra note 80, at 535 (“Prosecutorial guidelines ought to counsel the 
selection of cases that will convey the message that a serious institutional lapse that produces 
crime is deviant.”). 
 132. See Brickey, supra note 22, at 754 (identifying the lack of “a comprehensive rule of law 
under which corporations and their officers are held criminally responsible for workplace deaths 
and injuries” as “the most perplexing problem confronting the business community”). 
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First, it remains uncertain whether a corporation may be held liable 
for homicide in some jurisdictions. Second, the scheme is unable to 
account for latent organizational failures that set the stage for loss-of-
life incidents. The inability to penalize latent failures is one result of 
an overall doctrinal deficiency and has resulted in a poor track record 
of bringing criminal charges against large corporations, let alone of 
securing convictions. 
A. Definitional Deficiencies 
That existing homicide statutes are nebulous in their application 
to corporate defendants is unsurprising given that their drafters 
historically focused on individual conduct.133 Recall that legislatures 
corrected the most glaring definitional impediments to corporate 
homicide prosecutions by amending their penal codes to include a 
corporation as “persons” and deleting the requirement that the crime 
be committed “by another.”134 Courts in several jurisdictions, though, 
remained reluctant to impose criminal liability for certain offenses, 
including homicide, without more specific legislative action. 
For example, in 1961, the Oregon Supreme Court construed the 
state’s manslaughter statute to preclude corporate liability, following 
the legislature’s command to allow criminal liability “unless the 
context requires otherwise.”135 The court read the common-law 
phraseology that homicide was the killing by one person of “another” 
to exclusively mean a “human being.”136 In response, the Oregon 
legislature amended the criminally negligent homicide provision to 
encompass situations when “[a] person . . . causes the death of 
another person.”137 But the general homicide provision retained the 
language that homicide is when “[a] person . . . causes the death of 
another human being.”138 As one commentator notes, these statutory 
amendments left unsettled the larger doctrinal question “as to 
 133. See Bixby, supra note 60, at 356 (“Many of these [criminal] statutes were initially 
drafted with individual conduct in mind and failed to indicate whether the statute applied to 
actions taken, or not taken, by a business entity.”). 
 134. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 135. State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en banc) (interpreting OR. REV. 
STAT. § 161.010 (repealed 1971)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.145 (2009). 
 138. Id. § 163.005 (emphasis added). 
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whether a party committing manslaughter must be a natural 
person.”139 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also seized upon the 
“where appropriate” proviso in the state’s penal code140 to hold that a 
corporation could not be convicted of perjury.141 The court found that 
“the Legislature has found it ‘appropriate’ to impose criminal liability 
on corporations only for certain crimes enumerated in the Code: i.e., 
those crimes in which the Legislature has specifically provided for 
corporate liability.”142 This definitional uncertainty serves neither 
prosecutors, who are left unsure of their power to indict a corporation 
for homicide, nor corporations, who are left without sufficient notice 
of the fact that they may be indicted for homicide.143 
B. Latent Failures and Causation 
Any prosecution of a corporation for homicide must prove that 
the corporation’s conduct was causally linked to the death.144 A 
narrow judicial construction of causality can result in no liability for a 
corporate actor even though its policies, practices, or culture created 
the conditions necessary for an act to prove deadly. For example, in 
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,145 the corporate defendant was 
charged with second-degree manslaughter for a factory explosion that 
killed six employees.146 Several months prior to the explosion, the 
corporation’s insurer notified management that the factory’s 
 139. RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PREVENTION § 7.01, at 
7-4 (13th version 2011). 
 140. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2(11) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining a person as “[a] human being, 
and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a 
partnership, a government, or a governmental instrumentality”). 
 141. State v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So. 2d 230, 234 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). 
 142. Id. at 233; see also Commonwealth v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 10 Va. Cir. 118, 118 
(Cir. Ct. 1987) (declining to “extend corporate responsibility to crimes of personal violence” 
because “[i]f public policy requires the extension of corporate responsibility in this area, that is a 
matter for the Legislature and not this Court”). 
 143. See Samuels, supra note 24, at 891 (critiquing traditional homicide laws as “fail[ing] to 
give adequate notice to corporations and their decisionmakers that their actions fall within the 
scope of these statutory prohibitions and fail[ing] to set adequate guidelines to govern corporate 
behavior”). 
 144. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (15th ed. 1993) 
(summarizing causation in criminal law as “requiring that the accused’s conduct be a substantial 
factor in causing the harmful result or that it be the proximate, primary, direct, efficient, or legal 
cause of such harmful result”). 
 145. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1980). 
 146. Id. at 661. 
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machinery was susceptible to combustible residue buildups.147 The 
corporation decided to wait and replace the machinery gradually over 
several months, and the fatal incident occurred in the interim.148 The 
court dismissed the indictment because the corporation’s conduct 
could neither be reckless nor negligent when there existed only “a 
broad, undifferentiated risk of an explosion.”149 For homicide liability 
to exist, there must be “proof sufficient to support a finding that 
defendants foresaw or should have foreseen the physical cause of the 
explosion.”150 In other words, it must be proven that the corporation 
foresaw the precise conduct that caused the deadly explosion even if 
the explosion itself—a sufficiently dangerous event—was 
foreseeable.151 
Although the Warner-Lambert court found no basis for liability, 
insights from organizational theory suggest that the corporation’s 
“latent” failure could be a sufficient basis for criminal charges.152 A 
latent failure occurs when one or more latent conditions—design 
failures, insufficient training, and inadequate supervision, for 
example—“combine with local circumstances and active failures”—in 
other words, the acts by “front-line” personnel that have immediate, 
adverse effects.153 Active failures are generally the result of discrete, 
individual lapses, but latent conditions are the product of 
management decisions whose dire consequences may not be apparent 
for some time.154 It is easier to focus on active failures because of their 
 147. Id. at 662–63. 
 148. Id. at 663. 
 149. Id. at 661. 
 150. Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
 151. See People v. Roth, 604 N.E.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. 1992) (“For purposes of criminal liability, it 
was not enough to show that, given the variety of dangerous conditions existing at the site, an 
explosion was foreseeable; instead the People were required to show that it was foreseeable that 
the explosion would occur in the manner that it did.”). But see State v. Far W. Water & Sewer 
Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming the homicide conviction of a corporation 
because its conduct “set in motion a series of events that led to the incident and which were not 
so unforeseeable that it would be unfair to hold [the corporation] criminally liable,” regardless 
of the fact that the “precise result or injury” could not have been foreseen); People v. Deitsch, 
470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 164–65 (App. Div. 1983) (sustaining the indictment for criminally negligent 
homicide of a corporation “who maintains what is, in effect, a fire trap, no matter what the 
cause of the fire”). 
 152. See Celia Wells, Derek Morgan & Oliver Quick, Disasters: A Challenge for the Law, 39 
WASHBURN L.J. 496, 499–501 (2000) (“Rarely, according to [the organizational approach], are 
errors and disasters the product of the last link in the chain, i.e., the active error.”). 
 153. JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 10 (1997). 
 154. See id. at 11 (noting how latent conditions are “spawned in the upper echelons of the 
organization”). 
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immediate effects, but active failures “are now seen more as 
consequences than as principal causes.”155 Without the latent 
conditions created by management, active failures might not take 
place, or they might not have such devastating results. 
A vivid example of a latent failure is the deadly fire on the 
Deepwater Horizon rig.156 A presidential commission found that 
“[m]ost, if not all, of the failures at [the rig could] be traced back to 
underlying failures of management and communication” by BP and 
its partners, who owned and operated the rig.157 Due to breakdowns 
in information sharing, “individuals often found themselves making 
critical decisions without a full appreciation for the context in which 
they were being made (or even without recognition that the decisions 
were critical).”158 For example, those managing the rig’s drilling 
operations were unaware of the venture’s chain of command and of 
who was responsible for setting drilling procedures.159 Evidence 
suggests that there was no systematic process for testing drilling 
methods—including the ineffective technique of sealing off the well 
that caused the explosion—before they were used on the rig,.160 Cost-
saving efforts in the drilling timetable were not carefully balanced 
against the need to “not adversely affect overall risk.”161 Thus, latent 
failures in technical design, personnel training, operational 
 155. Id. at 10. 
 156. For a discussion of the Deepwater Horizon incident, see supra text accompanying notes 
6–11. The Deepwater Horizon incident is far from the only example of a latent failure that 
proved to be deadly. In January 2009, one of the largest food recalls in American history took 
place because of the presence of salmonella in peanut products. Gardiner Harris, Peanut Plant 
Broadens Product List Under Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A15. Salmonella poisoning 
from peanut butter has been linked to nine fatalities and hundreds more illnesses. Investigation 
Update: Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections, 2008–2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update
.html. The peanut processor knew that its products had tested positive for salmonella on twelve 
separate occasions prior to the deadly incident, but it failed to conduct an internal overhaul or 
to review food-safety measures. Harris, supra. 
 157. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 122. 
 158. Id. at 123. 
 159. See id. at 326 n.159 (recounting how the rig’s “Engineering Team Leader” responded to 
a question about who formulated operational procedures by asking “to look at [BP’s] chart of 
roles and responsibilities”). 
 160. Id. at 125. The commission found no evidence that BP or its partners “conducted any 
sort of formal analysis to assess the relative riskiness of available alternatives.” Id. 
 161. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 9, at xi. 
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supervision, and team communication were responsible for causing a 
preventable accident.162 
Greater accountability for latent failures would also remedy an 
undesirable tendency not to bring homicide charges against large 
corporations.163 This lack of accountability is unsurprising given that 
the difficulties in discerning latent conditions and linking them 
causally to a loss of life are exacerbated when applied to large 
corporate bureaucracies. Previous corporate homicide prosecutions 
have largely been against small companies in which both ownership 
and day-to-day management are vested in the same individuals.164 The 
owner-operators of small businesses, though, are more likely to be 
individually charged with homicide, rendering corporate charges 
superfluous.165 In a large corporation, on the other hand, individual 
liability is much more likely to be shrouded in complex organizational 
and decisionmaking structures that complicate the search for a readily 
identifiable individual defendant. 
IV.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CORPORATE 
HOMICIDE LIABILITY SCHEME 
In 2007, the United Kingdom’s Parliament adopted a new 
statutory regime for corporate criminal liability for homicide.166 The 
Act “broke dramatically” from past judicial precedent by providing a 
specific and expanded process for holding corporations liable.167 A 
long time in the making,168 the Act was the product of public outcry 
 162. See id. at x (“Better management of personnel, risk, and communications by BP and its 
contractors would almost certainly have prevented the blowout.”). 
 163. In this respect, the United States is not alone. This failure was the primary impetus 
behind the United Kingdom’s passage of a new statutory regime for corporate homicide, as 
discussed in Part IV, infra. 
 164. See, e.g., People v. Deitsch, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163, 165 (App. Div. 1983) (sustaining an 
indictment against a corporate defendant whose senior managers were responsible for 
maintaining the condition that led to a fatality). 
 165. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 166. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19 (U.K.). 
 167. Beale, supra note 74, at 1495–97. 
 168. See James Gobert, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007—
Thirteen Years in the Making but Was It Worth the Wait?, 71 M.L.R. 413, 413 (2008) (explaining 
that a corporate homicide act was first recommended in a Law Commission report dating from 
the mid-1990s). 
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after corporate actors escaped criminal liability for several deadly 
incidents.169 
The Act provides that a corporation170 is guilty of corporate 
manslaughter “if the way in which its activities are managed or 
organised . . . causes a person’s death, and . . . amounts to a gross 
breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the 
deceased.”171 The “relevant duty of care” owed to the deceased 
sounds in civil-negligence duties, including those owed to employees, 
to occupiers of the corporation’s premises, and to those who receive 
the corporation’s goods.172 A gross breach is one in which the 
corporation’s conduct “falls far below what can reasonably be 
expected of the organisation in the circumstances.”173 Akin to the 
MPC’s “high managerial agent” requirement,174 the Act links 
corporate liability to the conduct of “senior management [as] a 
substantial element in the breach.”175 
To assist jurors in determining whether a gross breach has 
occurred, the Act focuses their attention on several factors. The jury 
is required to consider whether the corporation “failed to comply with 
 169. See Editorial, Deadly Negligence, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 6, 2007, at 26 
(condemning the fact that only six corporations had been successfully prosecuted for 
manslaughter in the twenty years following the prosecution of a corporate ferry operator for an 
incident in which 193 people died); David Millward, Network Rail Fined £4m for Crash That 
Left 31 Dead, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 31, 2007, at 12 (reporting that families of 
victims in a deadly railway crash were calling for a corporate manslaughter law); Mark Milner, 
Executives Cleared of Train Crash Blame, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 7, 2005, at 6 (reporting 
that the dismissal of charges against companies whose negligence caused a deadly railway crash 
spurred momentum for revisions in corporate manslaughter law). 
 170. The Act applies to all manner of business entities. See Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act § 1(2)(a), (d) (applying the Act to corporations, partnerships, and 
other employers). Interestingly, the Act also applies to all manner of government entities. Id. 
§ 1(2)(b)–(c), sch. 1. Although beyond the scope of this Note’s proposed statutory framework, 
the extension of liability to governmental bodies is a matter for future consideration. It is 
conceivable that through collusion or dereliction of duty, government regulators could facilitate 
corporate conduct that results in death. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra 
note 2, at 77–78 (suggesting that because of oversight failures by mine-safety regulators, mines 
failed to correct known safety abuses at the Upper Big Branch mine). 
 171. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(1)(a)–(b). 
 172. Id. § 2(1). 
 173. Id. § 1(4)(b). 
 174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962). 
 175. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(3). Senior management is 
defined as those persons who play “significant roles in . . . the making of decisions about how 
the whole or a substantial part of [the corporation’s] activities are to be managed or organised, 
or . . . the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.” 
Id. § 1(4)(c). 
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any health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach, 
and if so, . . . how serious that failure was . . . [and] how much of a risk 
of death it posed.”176 In effect, this requirement supplements and 
enhances the deterrent effect of existing regulations by forcing juries 
to consider violations of those regulations in weighing the 
manslaughter charge. The jury is also permitted to consider whether 
“there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices within 
the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any such failure 
[to comply with health and safety legislation], or to have produced 
tolerance of it.”177 With such latitude, the jury may consider the 
corporate culture and policies that yield latent conditions as a 
component of the corporation’s culpability. 
By design, the dual requirements that (1) the corporation’s 
conduct must fall far below what is expected and that (2) senior 
management must play a substantial role in the breach largely cabin 
the Act’s reach to “systemic failures.”178 This circumscription stands in 
contrast to standard health and safety regulatory violations, which 
may involve “operational” failures that often only require that the 
corporation fall just below “the standard of reasonable 
practicability.”179 The Act’s dual requirements also anticipatorily 
rebut any argument that a corporate defendant might face criminal 
liability solely on the basis of a low-level employee’s unauthorized 
acts. The threshold established by the Act’s two prongs—a gross 
breach and the involvement of senior management—will exclude 
those cases in which a low-level employee’s unauthorized acts 
inflicted harm, but will not allow corporations that have clearly 
engaged in culpable behavior to escape liability.180 
With respect to sentencing, the Act provides three tools. First, 
courts may issue a “remedial order” requiring the corporation to 
remedy “any matter that appears . . . to have resulted from the 
relevant breach and to have been a cause of the death.”181 The 
remedial-order power also permits a sentencing authority to address 
systemic failings “in the organisation’s policies, systems or practices” 
 176. Id. § 8(2). 
 177. Id. § 8(3)(a). 
 178. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER & HEALTH AND 
SAFETY OFFENCES CAUSING DEATH: DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 3 (2010). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 4. 
 181. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 9(1)(b). 
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related to the charged conduct.182 Second, courts may issue a 
“publicity order” requiring a corporation to publicize its conviction 
and the relevant details of its offense and sentence.183 Finally, courts 
may levy a fine on a convicted corporation.184 
Although only one corporation has been prosecuted under the 
new Act,185 it has engendered much debate.186 Particular criticism has 
been targeted at the Act’s stringent requirement that senior managers 
play a substantial role in the breach, as opposed to a lesser standard 
under which managers must play only an intervening or contributing 
role.187 The senior-manager requirement may make it harder to 
convict a large corporation in which authority is diffused through a 
complex organizational structure.188 
Nonetheless, the Act is expected to have important “symbolic 
effects.”189 It makes clear that, as a doctrinal matter, corporations “are 
capable of committing crimes as grave as manslaughter.”190 With 
juries empowered to look more globally at corporate policies, 
corporations must “take a fresh look at their culture and ethos.”191 
And perhaps most importantly, indictment and conviction for 
corporate manslaughter will almost certainly carry greater deterrent 
 182. Id. § 9(1)(c). 
 183. Id. § 10(1); see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, supra note 178, at 8 (stating 
that publicity orders “should ordinarily be imposed in a case of corporate manslaughter” to 
serve the goals of “deterrence and punishment”). 
 184. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(6). 
 185. Although the Act was passed in response to major incidents involving numerous 
fatalities and large corporate actors, the only subsequent prosecution to date is of a small 
engineering-consulting firm that was convicted in February 2011 and sentenced to pay a 
£385,000 fine. Gloucestershire Firm Fined £385,000 over Trench Death, BBC NEWS, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-12491199 (last updated Feb. 17, 2011, 14:46 ET). 
But reports suggest that authorities are considering prosecuting a large, global private-security 
firm. Paul Lewis & Matthew Taylor, G4S Faces Possible Corporate Killing Charge over Death of 
Deportee, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 17, 2011, at 20. 
 186. One commentator criticizes the Act as being “limited in its vision and lacking in 
imagination.” Gobert, supra note 168, at 414. 
 187. See id. at 429 (“In the absence of [a command-responsibility] provision, organisations 
will be able . . . to render themselves virtually manslaughter-proof by placing a junior member 
of staff in charge of potentially lethal dimensions of a company’s business or safety generally.”). 
 188. See Brenda Barrett, Liability for Safety Offences: Is the Law Still Fatally Flawed?, 37 
IND. LAW J. 100, 107 (2008) (“The only managers who have been convicted of manslaughter 
following work-related fatalities have been managers or employers in small businesses.”). 
 189. Gobert, supra note 168, at 431; see also Barrett, supra note 188, at 117 (claiming that 
the Act may also have an important impact in areas with little regulatory control). 
 190. Gobert, supra note 168, at 431. 
 191. Id. at 432. 
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and punitive weight than liability for violating health and safety 
regulations.192 
V.  A STATUTORY PROPOSAL AND EXPLANATION 
This Part seeks to initiate a discourse on corporate criminal 
liability for homicide by proposing a comprehensive statutory 
framework.193 Just as legislatures enacted measures to expand 
corporate criminal liability to homicide, those same bodies should 
now reevaluate the efficacy of their efforts and take the lead in 
refining corporate homicide doctrine.194 The provisions discussed in 
this Part were devised with two primary goals in mind: (1) providing 
notice of the proscribed conduct to those subject to the statute and to 
those enforcing it,195 and (2) ensuring that prosecutions under the 
statute satisfy the public’s need for accountability and yet are 
tempered by the ultimate benefits of corporate rehabilitation.196 
A. A Proposed Corporate Homicide Statute 
To address the concerns and imperfections in the existing 
corporate homicide regime, the following statutory language is 
proposed: 
 
 
 192. See Barrett, supra note 188, at 117 (arguing that, at a minimum, a “corporation will 
suffer a greater stigma [for a corporate manslaughter conviction] than [for] being convicted 
under [the Health and Safety at Work Act], which is too readily perceived as merely regulatory 
legislation”); Gobert, supra note 168, at 431 (“All would regard manslaughter as a serious 
offence; in contrast, health and safety violations are often viewed as involving technical 
breaches of overly protective rules laid down by a nanny state.”). 
 193. There is an easier option than comprehensive statutory reevaluation: amend the 
existing homicide statutes to specifically permit charges against corporations. This is not a 
solution to be favored, however. Businesses presumably would favor the neutral-sounding 
offense of corporate homicide over the more reprehensible charges of manslaughter or murder. 
Moreover, comprehensive drafting offers greater opportunities for doctrinal reform to address 
underlying systemic deficiencies in areas like causation and punishment. 
 194. It is accepted that a well-crafted, comprehensive statute best serves principles of 
legality. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 
VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985). 
 195. See id. at 205 (“Notice is essential to fairness.”). 
 196. See Henning, supra note 90, at 1429 (“The goal . . . should be on molding punishment to 
the remediation of any harm and reforming the corporation, so that retribution would play no 
role in determining the appropriate criminal sanction.”). 
HARLOW IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:52:03 PM 
154 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:123 
Model Corporate Homicide Statute 
1. An organization is guilty of corporate homicide when it 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of a 
human being. 
2. First-degree corporate homicide occurs when: 
a. through the actions or omissions of an owner, 
management official, or other similarly situated 
individual; 
b. an organization knowingly or recklessly creates or 
tolerates a condition under circumstances manifesting 
extreme disregard for human life; and 
c. that condition causes the death of a human being. 
3. Second-degree corporate homicide occurs when: 
a. through the actions or omissions of an owner, 
management official, supervisor, or other similarly 
situated individual; 
b. an organization recklessly or negligently creates or 
tolerates a condition; and 
c. that condition causes the death of a human being. 
4. As provided in Sections 2 and 3: 
a. an organization’s culpability may be established by the 
knowledge and actions, whether individually or 
collectively, of owners, officers, management officials, 
supervisors, or other similarly situated individuals with a 
duty or responsibility to communicate their knowledge to 
someone else within the organization; 
b. in determining liability of the organization, the following 
may be considered as evidence: 
i. prior health or safety regulatory violations 
pertaining to the condition causing death, except 
when the organization did not have notice of the 
violation; 
ii. organizational policies, practices, and culture. 
5. An organization found guilty under Sections 2 or 3 of this Act: 
a. shall be fined up to a maximum of ten million dollars per 
victim; and 
b. may be subject to a period of probation not to exceed five 
years, with the sentencing court to consider as conditions 
of probation: 
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i. the remedying of the condition(s) that led to the 
loss of life; 
ii. the adoption and implementation of an effective 
corporate compliance program; 
iii. the reassignment of those owners, management 
officials, supervisors, or other similarly situated 
individuals whose conduct was causally linked to 
the loss of life; 
iv. the efforts by the organization to refine or 
restructure its operations or organization to guard 
against the recurrence of the condition(s) that led 
to the loss of life. 
6. For the purposes of this Act, 
a. “organization” means any entity registered or licensed to 
do business within the jurisdiction and any entity, 
whether charitable or not, engaged in the manufacture, 
distribution, transportation, sale, or provision of goods or 
services within the jurisdiction; 
b. “owner” means any natural person or legal entity with an 
ownership stake in the organization; 
c. “management official” means any officer, director, or 
other individual responsible for formulating or 
implementing policies across the organization or within 
the particular business unit where the condition existed; 
d. “supervisor” means any employee to whom subsections 
(b) and (c) above do not apply and who is responsible for 
supervising the operational activities of the organization 
or a portion thereof, and the employees carrying them 
out. 
B. Commentary on the Proposed Statute 
1. Section One: Establishment of the Offense.  The first section of 
the proposed statute creates a new offense of corporate homicide. It 
immediately resolves any uncertainty courts might have about the 
legislature’s intent to hold corporations criminally liable for homicide. 
The statute is also narrowly drawn to encompass only those 
conditions that cause a death.197 It rejects previous proposals that 
 197. Such narrow tailoring is intended to deflect criticism that this proposal adds to the 
unprincipled overbreadth of criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
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sought to extend criminal liability to all life-endangering conduct 
whether or not a death resulted.198 A life-endangering offense would 
sweep too broadly in situations in which the best remedy is the civil 
regulatory scheme and in which early recourse to criminal law would 
diminish its forcefulness. But the proposed corporate homicide 
offense would apply to any person whose death was caused by 
corporate action or inaction, regardless of that person’s relationship 
to the corporation—employee, consumer, or member of the general 
public. 
2. Section Two: First-Degree Corporate Homicide.  The second 
section of the proposed statute sets forth the elements of the most 
serious level of corporate homicide. For the statute to apply, a 
corporation must have acted knowingly or recklessly, evidencing an 
extreme disregard for human life by creating or tolerating a condition 
that resulted in death.199 The mens rea element may also be satisfied 
when corporate officials deliberately avoid attaining knowledge of the 
condition.200 Thus, liability ensues when a corporation takes 
affirmative steps to create a deadly condition or when it is aware of a 
condition but declines to remedy it. 
By specifying the individuals whose conduct may be attributed to 
the corporation, the section reaches a middle ground between 
respondeat superior and the MPC’s section 2.07. The liability 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001) (“American criminal law’s historical 
development has borne no relation to any plausible normative theory—unless ‘more’ counts as 
a normative theory.”). Because homicide was one of the traditional common-law crimes, 
Professor Stuntz believes that modifications to homicide doctrine do not present the same 
concerns about overbreadth that are presented by other expansions of criminal law. See id. at 
512–13 (noting that for crimes of violence, the “definitions are not substantially broader today 
than they were generations or even centuries ago”). 
 198. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 432–33 (advocating that Congress create an 
offense for life-endangering conduct); Samuels, supra note 24, at 902 (proposing a reckless-
endangerment-of-an-employee offense). 
 199. This language is derived from the MPC’s homicide statute. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.2(1) (1962) (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely 
or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.”). 
 200. Federal courts routinely permit jury instructions that explain that the knowledge 
requirement can be satisfied by “deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance.” United States 
v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also id. at 338 n.2 (citing federal 
appellate cases that discuss jury instructions related to the knowledge requirement). In United 
States v. Ramirez, 574 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2009), for example, the court explained that criminal 
knowledge may be inferred when evidence suggests that a defendant remained deliberately 
ignorant, provided that his conduct rose above “mere negligence.” Id. at 877. 
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prescribed in this section is more limited than respondeat superior 
because corporate officials must be of a certain seniority for their 
conduct to qualify. But it is more expansive than section 2.07’s “high 
managerial agent” requirement because it broadly defines 
management officials and includes those employees within the 
particular business unit where the condition existed.201 This provision 
attempts to account for the decentralized nature of modern 
corporations, with their many far-flung and distinct business units. In 
sum, first-degree corporate homicide reflects a belief that the most 
serious cases are those in which blameworthiness reaches the more 
senior levels of the corporate ranks.202 
3. Section Three: Second-Degree Corporate Homicide.  The 
proposed statute’s third section sets forth the less severe level of 
corporate homicide: the corporation must have acted recklessly or 
negligently in creating or tolerating a condition that caused death. 
Second-degree corporate homicide adopts an approach akin to 
respondeat superior. It simultaneously expands the number of 
corporate employees whose conduct may be the basis for liability by 
including supervisors203 and lowers the minimum mens rea to 
negligence. 
Although some commentators worry that recklessness- or 
negligence-based liability is too flexible because it relies on a 
“prevailing reasonable standard of care,”204 those concerns are 
outweighed by the costs of the alternative. To predicate liability 
solely upon a minimum mens rea of knowledge would require that 
 201. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(B) (2010) (defining 
“high-level personnel” to include “a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of a 
major business or functional unit of the organization . . . ; and an individual with a substantial 
ownership interest”). 
 202. Cf. id. § 8C2.5(b) (prescribing an enhancement to a defendant corporation’s sentence if 
either “high-level personnel of the [business] unit” or personnel with “substantial authority” 
were involved). 
 203. Cf. id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (defining a subcategory of “corporate officials” as those 
“who exercise substantial supervisory authority,” such as “a plant manager [or] a sales 
manager”). 
 204. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 422. For Spurgeon and Fagan, this is problematic 
because what is reasonable might shift in the time between the corporate actions that caused a 
death and the subsequent indictment. Id. It can be assumed that Spurgeon and Fagan are 
concerned with protecting conduct regarded as reasonable at the time it was taken, but which 
became unreasonable by the time of the indictment. But it seems unlikely that prevailing 
concepts of reasonable precautions will evolve so substantially in this time period to cause an 
unjust indictment. 
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corporate actors were “practically certain” death would result from 
their actions or omissions.205 The situations in which corporate actors 
will know to a high degree of certainty that their conduct will result in 
death seem limited. Indeed, it is conceivable that evidence of 
repeated regulatory violations related to a condition that caused 
death could actually support a contrary position: How could the 
corporate actors have been certain that death would result when the 
unsafe condition had existed for some time without adverse 
consequences? A reasonable duty of care standard ensures that not 
all failures to take potentially preventative action will result in 
criminal liability, but it also ensures that an organization will “provide 
adequate defences against the[] unsafe consequences” that may arise 
from operations.206 The reasonableness requirement entrenched 
within the recklessness and negligence duties of care sets the bar high 
enough to avoid creating a situation in which a corporation feels 
legally bound to take all possible precautions regardless of their 
reasonableness. 
4. Section Four: Collective Knowledge.  The fourth section of the 
proposed statute presents both a single-actor—the conventional 
means of finding corporate liability—and a collective knowledge 
approach to corporate liability. Under the single-actor model, a 
corporation may be liable only when one of its employees or agents 
possesses the requisite mens rea for each element of the offense.207 
Collective knowledge, on the other hand, works “by aggregating the 
individual knowledge of several corporate employees so as to create a 
collective state of mind for the corporation.”208 The collective 
knowledge standard proposed here also limits the scope of employees 
whose mens rea may be imputed to the corporation to those with a 
responsibility—whether imposed by law or through internal policy—
to report their knowledge to someone else in the organization.209 
The basic rationale for collective knowledge, as elucidated by the 
 205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962). 
 206. JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 206 (1990). 
 207. V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate 
Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 357 (1999). 
 208. 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 8.21, at 380. 
 209. See United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving a 
jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider knowledge gathered by “supervisor[s] or 
employee[s]” against the corporation, so long as those persons “ha[d] some duty to 
communicate that knowledge to someone higher up in the corporation”). 
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First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A.,210 is that 
“[t]he acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its 
employees operating within the scope of their employment.”211 The 
collective knowledge doctrine is a response to the reality that modern 
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the 
elements of specific duties and operations into smaller 
components.”212 Collective knowledge also recognizes the unique 
capacities for information retention, diffusion, and usage possessed by 
organizations.213 This mode of analysis is also supported by 
organizational theory, which “does not attempt to reduce corporate 
actions to individual intentions.”214 
The concept of collective knowledge is not without harsh 
skeptics in academia and on the bench.215 But the statute proposed 
here does not rise and fall with collective knowledge. The provision 
may be readily severed by any jurisdiction that declines to adopt the 
collective knowledge approach. Nonetheless, the debate over 
collective knowledge is one worth having because it cuts to the heart 
of corporate liability, given modern organizational and bureaucratic 
realities. 
5. Section Four: Evidence of Corporate Practices, Culture, and 
Prior Regulatory Violations.  Section 4.b of the proposed Act allows 
prosecutors to introduce evidence of organizational culture and 
policies to prove that a corporation created or tolerated a deadly 
 210. United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 211. Id. at 856. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d at 492 (“Files may be destroyed, and people may 
forget about data in file cabinets, but a memorandum . . . remains in the corporation’s 
knowledge as long as the memo itself continues to exist (and, even after its destruction, as long 
as a responsible employee remembers it).”). 
 214. Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding 
of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1300 (1990). 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (holding that, in the False Claims Act context, “‘collective knowledge’ provides an 
inappropriate basis for proof of scienter because it effectively imposes liability . . . for a type of 
loose constructive knowledge” (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 
1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. 
of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Mass. 2010) (rejecting the collective knowledge doctrine and 
adhering to the principle that “a corporation acts with a given mental state . . . only if at least 
one employee who acts (or fails to act) possesses the requisite mental state”); Hasnas, supra 
note 33, at 1338 n.38 (“The collective knowledge doctrine is probably more vulnerable to 
objections than the New York Central [respondeat-superior] standard.”). 
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condition. Corporate culture is an important underlying cause of 
corporate misconduct.216 Culture is an organic part of an organization 
and reflects the desires and actions of its leadership.217 For example, a 
corporate culture that encourages increased speed and profitability at 
the unreasonable expense of safety will inevitably produce corporate 
culpability evidence. Likewise, the absence of corporate policies to 
ensure safe operations indicates an organization’s willingness to 
tolerate risk.218 Indeed, as corporate policies “are often the results of 
more than a simple aggregation of individual choices,”219 they 
constitute some of the most direct evidence against the corporation as 
a singular entity.220 The use of evidence of corporate culture to prove 
a corporation’s mens rea is also well established in other common-law 
jurisdictions.221 
Section 4.b additionally authorizes factfinders to hear evidence 
of relevant prior regulatory violations. It recognizes that a 
corporation’s affirmative decision to ignore or to insufficiently cure a 
dangerous condition is particularly probative “where there ha[s] been 
 216. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (1991) (surveying organizational studies and concluding 
that “(1) each corporation is distinctive and draws its uniqueness from a complex combination 
of formal and informal factors; (2) the formal and informal structure of a corporation can 
promote, or discourage, violations of the law; and (3) this structure is identifiable, observable, 
and malleable”); James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social 
and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17–18 
(2009) (“[T]he culture of a business firm . . . permeates the organization and normalizes certain 
conduct.”). 
 217. See REASON, supra note 153, at 193–94 (describing “culture” as something that a 
business “has” rather than “is” and which is modifiable through management’s efforts). 
 218. See, e.g., State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) 
(describing evidence that a defendant corporation charged with criminally negligent homicide 
“did not hold safety meetings and had no written safety polices [sic] or written records regarding 
safety training”). 
 219. Foerschler, supra note 214, at 1302. 
 220. See id. at 1303 (“[C]orporate policies . . . should be attributed to the corporate structure 
as a whole and considered as conceptually independent from the intents of the individuals 
within the corporation.”). 
 221. The Australian federal criminal code permits evidence that “a corporate culture existed 
within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance” with 
the prohibitive statute. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 12.3(2)(c) (Austl.). It defines a corporate 
culture as “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body 
corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take 
place.” Id. at s 12.3(6). Similarly, the United Kingdom’s corporate manslaughter statute permits 
the jury to consider evidence of “attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices” that “were 
likely to have encouraged” the corporation’s misconduct. Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c. 19, § 8(3)(a) (U.K.). 
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a prior warning by a government employee of claimed statutory 
violations.”222 The subsection also builds upon the collective 
knowledge doctrine to impute awareness to a corporation regardless 
of whether the employees who maintained the dangerous condition 
were different from those who interacted with the regulators.223 
Section 4.b emphasizes the proposed statute’s role as a buttress 
for existing regulatory regimes. Corporations are on notice that 
ignoring the warning signs of regulatory violations may have adverse 
repercussions in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Past regulatory 
violations are probative of criminal intent because regulatory statutes 
already reflect legislative or administrative policy determinations that 
certain conduct must be prohibited.224 To circumscribe liability, a 
jurisdiction may choose to enumerate the specific health and safety 
regulations that apply to corporate homicide.225 
6. Section Five: Punishment.  Punishment for corporate homicide 
is bipartite, melding economic and structural sentencing policies to 
achieve the foremost goal of rehabilitation.226 The first part of 
Section 5 consists of a fine of up to $10 million per victim. Criminal 
fines are the standard form of corporate punishment. To omit a fine 
or to provide for too minimal of a fine could subject the statute to 
skepticism regardless of whether the maximum fine was ever 
imposed.227 But a criminal fine alone has limited deterrent and 
 222. United States v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Minn. 1971), aff’d, 463 
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 223. See id. at 30–31 (finding that the defendant trucking company had willfully violated a 
criminal prohibition against maintaining false logs given that regulators had warned company 
officials several times about the practice, despite the fact that those officials were not the ones 
maintaining the logs). 
 224. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 432 (“By enacting regulatory statutes that 
specify allowable behavior, Congress has in effect decided which deaths caused by the industrial 
process are to be excusable.”). 
 225. See id. at 408 & n.42 (providing an example in which a proposed federal reckless-
endangerment statute creates liability only for violations of certain enumerated regulatory 
statutes). 
 226. The “Economic Model” of sentencing prefers the “us[e of] fines in lieu of corporate 
probation.” Wray, supra note 117, at 2020. The “Structural Reform Model,” on the other hand, 
relies on probationary measures “that will directly penetrate the bureaucratic web.” Id. 
 227. For example, two large corporations convicted of homicide were sentenced to fines of 
$11,500 and $7,500, respectively—both of which were the statutory maximum. Chase, supra note 
65 (reporting that Motiva Enterprises, an oil refiner, received the maximum fine of $11,500 for 
its homicide conviction, an amount that the judge later increased through an additional 
compensatory fine of $100,000); General Dynamics Land Systems Pleads No Contest in Worker’s 
Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 12, 1992, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
HARLOW IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:52:03 PM 
162 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:123 
 
rehabilitative powers.228 If a corporation fails to undertake internal 
restructuring to prevent a recurrence of the criminal conduct and 
instead simply pays a fine, “society is merely pricing, not sanctioning, 
offenders’ behavior.”229 
To ensure that the sentencing scheme accommodates societal 
and rehabilitative interests, the proposed statute expressly provides 
for the correction of fundamental deficiencies in corporate structure 
and management through probation. Its rationale is comparable to 
the justification behind the remedial measures provided for in the 
federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines230 and in the United 
Kingdom’s corporate manslaughter statute.231 Corporations charged 
or found guilty of corporate homicide presumably would be self 
motivated to undertake an internal restructuring without prompting 
by the court. But if the court finds that faulty internal controls—
nonexistent lines of communication between safety directors and 
operational supervisors, for example—or culpable employees remain 
unaddressed at the date of sentencing,232 it should have the authority 
to order remedial action.233 A corporate probation may be “flexibly 
tailored to corporate circumstances”234 to minimize the loss of 
managerial independence and maximize the penological value.235 
asp0000020011106do5c00z2u (reporting that General Dynamics was fined $7,500—the 
maximum under Michigan law—for involuntary manslaughter). 
 228. See Khanna, supra note 40, at 1511 (advocating reliance on “cash fines until their 
deterrent effect is exhausted and then [the] use [of] other legally imposed sanctions”). 
 229. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 652 
(1996). 
 230. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.2(a) (2010) (authorizing sentencing 
courts to use remedial orders to “eliminate or reduce the risk that the instant offense will cause 
future harm”). The Guidelines offer an illustrative example of ordering “a product recall for a 
food and drug violation.” Id. § 8B1.2 cmt. background. 
 231. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. 
 232. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.5 (noting that “[a]dequate 
discipline of individuals responsible for an offense is a necessary component of [the] 
enforcement” of an organization’s criminal sentence). 
 233. See id. § 8D1.1(a)(6) (instructing courts to sentence convicted corporate defendants to 
probation when “necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce 
the likelihood of future criminal conduct”). 
 234. Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate 
Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 106 (1988). 
 235. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 452 (1981) 
(“Ultimately, the relatively modest loss of managerial autonomy involved in such a temporary 
period of probation might prove as effective a deterrent as the financial penalties today imposed 
on corporations.”). 
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Through corporate probation, a sentencing court may be able to draw 
upon the expertise of regulators to assist in monitoring corporate 
compliance and oversee the implementation of internal reforms.236 
Probation may also require a convicted corporation to publicize its 
wrongful conduct—a sort of modern-day version of being placed in 
the public stocks.237 Even critics of corporate probation concede that 
it may be particularly useful against recidivist corporations 
“unresponsive to monetary penalties,”238 whom this statute is 
expressly designed to target. 
C. Illustrative Applications of the Proposed Statute 
1. Upper Big Branch Mine.  Of the three illustrations, Massey 
Energy’s operation of the Upper Big Branch mine presents the 
closest case for charging first-degree corporate homicide. To prove 
causation, prosecutors could rely on the evidence of repeated mine-
safety violations over a prolonged period for the very conditions that 
federal investigators believe caused the explosion.239 The requisite 
corporate mens rea could be found based on the knowledge of the 
Massey employees responsible for interacting with regulators and 
supervising mining operations who disregarded warning signs.240 
The key element for sustaining an indictment of first-degree 
corporate homicide is the presence of circumstances showing an 
extreme disregard for human life. Here, prosecutors could rely not 
only on evidence related to the direct causes of the explosion but also 
to Massey’s corporate practices and culture. A report to West 
Virginia’s governor about the incident found that “evidence strongly 
suggests” that the company did not place safety before profits.241 An 
investigation into the operation of Upper Big Branch uncovered a 
 236. Gruner, supra note 234, at 105. 
 237. The United Kingdom’s corporate homicide sentencing regime incorporates a “publicity 
order” component. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c. 19, § 10 
(U.K.). For a discussion of the pros and cons of publicity orders, see Khanna, supra note 40, at 
1503; and Miester, supra note 22, at 942–44. 
 238. Wray, supra note 117, at 2021. 
 239. See Broder, supra note 1 (mentioning the many citations Massey had received for 
noncompliance with health and safety regulations). 
 240. One report suggests that high-ranking executives for the Massey Energy subsidiary 
operating Upper Big Branch instructed a mine foreman not to worry about the ventilation 
problems cited by regulators a few months before the explosion. Steven Mufson, Mine 
Inspectors Found Negligence in January, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2010, at A2. Officials believe 
these ventilation problems were ultimately the cause of the explosion. Id. 
 241. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 95. 
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host of “deviant [safety] practices [that] became normalized.”242 Notes 
of federal mine-safety inspectors show that senior managers told 
lower-level employees who reported safety problems to disregard 
them.243 Evidence also suggests that Massey made it a corporate 
practice to appeal citations issued by federal regulators rather than to 
implement more stringent safety programs.244 If Massey were 
convicted, it would face a maximum fine of $290 million—$10 million 
per victim—and, more important, would be subject to a review of its 
internal safety and compliance programs by the sentencing court. 
2. Deepwater Horizon.  Assuming that BP was primarily 
responsible for the joint-venture operations on the Deepwater 
Horizon rig,245 a case could be built for second-degree corporate 
homicide. The presidential investigatory commission found that 
“management breakdown[s] . . . affected many of the operational 
aspects of designing and drilling the well.”246 Some of these 
breakdowns included “inadequate communication” and “excessive 
compartmentalization of information” between onshore engineers 
and rig operators.247 Evidence suggests that rig operators utilized 
untested drilling techniques and were left uninformed about an 
earlier incident that was similar to the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion.248 Moreover, in its drive to increase cost-efficient drilling 
operations, BP failed to properly account for the new operational risk 
paradigm.249 
These past practices and policies may demonstrate BP’s failure 
to exercise reasonable care when drilling for oil on the seabed. At the 
least, they could constitute negligence on the part of BP, a highly 
 242. Id. at 97; see also id. at 97–99 (detailing the unsafe practices at Upper Big Branch). 
 243. Mufson, supra note 240. 
 244. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 99–100 (“Fighting 
the violations allowed Massey to pay only a third of the assessed penalties over a ten-year 
period while accelerating profits, thus negating the punitive intent of the fines.”). 
 245. BP leased the rig from its owner, Transocean, and employed workers from Halliburton 
to help operate the rig. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
 246. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 9, at 225. 
 247. Id. at 227–28. For a full analysis of management failures, see id. at 225–50. 
 248. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 249. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 9, at 242 (finding that although BP understandably sought to manage 
costs, it failed “to properly account for risk or to assess the overall impact of decisions” on rig 
operations as a whole). 
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experienced party in drilling operations, for failing to appreciate the 
deadly risks of its dysfunctional management structure and operation. 
If BP were found guilty, a sentencing court might require the 
corporation and its partners to restructure its joint venture to remedy 
the kinds of latent conditions that proved so deadly, in addition to 
imposing a fine up to the $110 million statutory maximum. 
3. Glen Care Nursing Home.  Glen Care presents a likely case of 
second-degree corporate homicide. The assisted-living center 
permitted untrained health aides to check the glucose levels of 
residents without implementing basic disease-prevention measures.250 
Evidence suggests that Glen Care offered a training session on proper 
disease prevention, but it failed to ensure that its employees attended 
the session.251 By having untrained employees provide medical care, 
Glen Care executives may have created a condition through their 
negligence that caused the death of six residents. Evidence of prior 
training lapses or inattention to health regulations might signify 
recklessness on the part of the corporation, but it would likely not 
establish the extreme indifference to human life necessary for a first-
degree charge. 
Glen Care would face a statutory maximum fine of $60 million. 
Given that Glen Care is a small business, however, any fine levied 
should be well under the maximum. Again, it would be more 
important for a sentencing court to ensure that Glen Care took 
proper remedial measures to prevent a recurrence. Following its 
criminal conviction, Glen Care might also need to negotiate with state 
and federal regulators to ensure that it would not be debarred from 
receiving Medicare funds.252 
CONCLUSION 
For more than a century, a legal tension has existed between 
proponents and opponents of extending criminal homicide law to 
corporations. As a result of this debate—a subset of the larger 
 250. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 252. The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services may refuse to renew a 
license for an adult-care home if the facility “shows a pattern of noncompliance with State 
law . . . or otherwise demonstrates disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of residents.” 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-2.4(b) (West 2010). Providers may not receive Medicaid funds from 
North Carolina if they are “not licensed or certified as required by federal and state law.” 10A 
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 22F.0302 (2010); see also supra note 120. 
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discussion over corporate criminal liability—the law has slowly 
evolved. Whereas corporate liability for homicide was once widely 
rejected, many jurisdictions have now come to accept the basic 
premises of this form of liability. Nonetheless, both as a matter of 
doctrine and in practice, corporate homicide liability continues to 
suffer from several deficiencies that leave prosecutors unable or 
reluctant to bring homicide charges against corporate defendants. 
Sound public policy commends that jurisdictions confront these 
deficiencies and create an effective and fair scheme to hold 
corporations criminally liable when their blameworthy conduct leads 
to the loss of life. 
This Note seeks to assist jurisdictions by providing model 
language for a corporate homicide statute. A specially crafted statute 
is the best means for legislatures to balance putative corporate 
defendants’ concerns about overcriminalization against society’s need 
for an effective—but fair—response to egregious corporate conduct. 
The deadly incidents described in this Note and others like them 
confirm the pressing need for legislation; it is now up to policymakers 
to decide the way forward. 
